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Abstract
This paper investigates a market with strictly complementary inputs, with
a particular emphasis on how efficiency can be implemented when the produc-
tive firms undertake unobservable effort. It is shown that simple linear sharing
rules cannot implement socially optimal effort, but a modified linear sharing
rule can implement the first-best outcome and a restricted linear sharing rule
can be used to implement the second-best outcome. In addition, problems
associated with commitment to the sharing rule is discussed.
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1 Introduction
In many markets end-user products are produced by a combined effort from two
or more economic agents providing complementary inputs. Such relationships can
be called teams or partnerships. In several applications the partnership consists
of agents in two different market segments, where one of the market segments is
monopolised whereas the other is a competitive market. In the literature on com-
munication markets the essential facility, typically a network provider, is a monopoly
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whereas the providers of communication services are typically operating in compet-
itive markets. The inputs are complementary and the inputs from both types of
firms are necessary in order for consumers to have positive valuations of the prod-
ucts. In rail transport, the infrastructure provider is often a monopoly, and the
train operators compete for end-users. The services offered by these two types of
firms are complementary, and the value of a train ticket is zero without tracks that
the trains can run on. In electricity markets, an end-user requires the services of
both a distribution firm and that of electricity providers. The value of one without
the other is zero. In the case of electricity and communications markets, it is not
uncommon that end-users contract only with a single firm which package the two
types of products. This could be either an (independent) intermediary, or one of the
firms.
In the present paper I will investigate a stylised setting with two types of produc-
tive firms in the model, which I will call platform providers and content providers. In
addition there may be an intermediary firm from which end-users purchase the final
product. In the model, the productive firms choose effort levels based on proposed
sharing rules. The platform services and contents are considered to be complemen-
tary products, and the product that interests customers is the composite product.
The platform provider is an essential facility for the content providers, and con-
tents and platform services are complementary inputs. The value of the services is
strictly positive only if both types of services are supplied in positive amounts. The
provider of platform services and content providers thus form a partnership. The
intermediary does not provide any value added in terms of the production of the
output, and simply collects the different parts of the service to provide a valuable
product for end-users. The intermediary may, however, add value in terms of welfare
in certain cases. This will, in particular, be the case when the platform provider has
no incentive to choose a sharing rule that implements the socially efficient outcome.
It is assumed that the effort of the distribution and content providers cannot be
observed. The assumption on non-observability essentially implies that end-users
cannot buy the products separately (or at least, that they cannot observe or verify
the quality of the individual components). If the (value of) total output is perceived
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to be low this could be either due to lack of effort by the platform provider, or
by lack of effort by the content providers. Effort can be thought of as investments
undertaken by the firms. A low level of investment in infrastructure can reduce the
speed of the network, and consequently lower the value of the bundled service. As
an example we could think of real-time applications on UMTS-telephones, such as
interactive maps, streaming video, video conferencing etc.. The quality of the real-
time application may in itself be very high, but without network bandwidth to cope
with the increased capacity requirements the value of the service is low to end-users.
A low level of investment in, e.g., compatibility by the content providers reduces
the value of the total output. If, for instance, a customer wishes to set up a mobile
video call, it is difficult for the caller and the receiver to distinguish which part of
the perceived quality that comes from the effort exerted by the network provider
to maintain a high capacity, and which part comes from the independent service
providers that offer mobile video call services.1 Another example of this could be
the case where IP connections traverse several network domains. In such a case the
quality of the connection (i.e., the bandwidth) is equal to the lowest quality in the
chain, and which network is the bottleneck is not observable to others (or at least,
it is prohibitively expensive to verify each sub-connection). Yet another example
is related to meta search engines and electronic scientific journals. A number of
university libraries have a search platform to enable end-users to search through
the library’s entire collection of electronic journals with a single search (i.e., no
need to go through the same search pattern in each of the individual databases of
journals). This platform could, for instance, be a combination of MetaLib (search
platform) and SFX (platform for providing direct links from the search platform to
the individual databases). The content providers are the different electronic journal
databases (ScienceDirect, SwetsWise, ProQuest etc.), and the university library is
the intermediary. For the end-user (students and faculty) it is difficult to ascertain
who is to blame if the overall quality of the service is poor, as this may be due to
either poor performance in the platform (due to lack of effort to perfect the platform)
1It may be easier for a mobile network operator to offer such mobile video call services, since
such a firm is better able to offer dedicated capacity for such a service.
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or due to poor search facilities in electronic journal library.
As is shown in Holmstrom (1982), a team providing substitute inputs (or, more
correctly, no strictly complementary inputs) will not be able to achieve a first-best
outcome in the absence of a principal when budget-balance is required, but the
presence of a principal may alleviate the sub-optimal solution posed by the budget-
balance requirement.2 In the present model, either the platform, the intermediary
or end-users may act as a principal. Contrary to the principal introduced in Holm-
strom (1982), the budget breaker in the present model may be an active member
of the partnership and can through her choice of effort affect total output. Legros
and Matthews (1993) show that free-riding in partnerships only causes problems to
the extent that the liability of the partners is limited. With unlimited liability, its
is shown that efficiency can be approximated using simple mixing strategies. They
also show that efficiency is sustainable if the partners actions are perfect comple-
ments. This is also the result of Vislie (1994), where it is demonstrated that a linear
(budget balancing) sharing mechanism can implement the team’s efficient outcome.
If participation constraints and limited liability is introduced in a Leontief part-
nership, Hvide (2001) shows that the results of Legros and Matthews (1993) and
Vislie (1994) no longer hold. Hvide (2001) shows that efficiency can be attained
by devising a sharing rule that is balanced, satisfies limited liability and incentive
compatibility and participation constraints. Hvide (2001) furthermore investigates
the effect of uncertainty. If noise is added to joint output, free-riding can be avoided,
whereas free-riding is inevitable if noise is added to individual productivity. McAfee
and McMillan (1991) show that optimal contracts in a team subject to both adverse
selection and moral hazard, are in certain cases linear in the team’s output. Fur-
thermore, they show that the outcome is the same whether the principal observes
only the total output or the individual team member’s effort, and consequently,
monitoring is not needed to avoid shirking.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyse the interaction between teams
2Rasmussen (1987) shows that an efficient budget-balancing contract exists without a budget











that provide complementary efforts and teams that provide substitute efforts. The
competition in the content market implies, as we will see, that a linear sharing rule
no longer can implement first-best efficiency if budget balance is required. The
main economic agents in the game and the relationships between them, is portrayed
in figure 1. The use of an intermediary in determining how to share the economic
outcome of a trading relationship when there is a monopoly platform and competing
providers of input via the platform (content) is investigated. This can be seen
as the independent "one-stop-shop". We will assume perfect competition between
intermediaries, which implies that the intermediary earns zero profit. Any surplus
of trade not allocated to the firms will be redistributed to end-users who may earn
positive consumers’ surplus. The main questions that we attempt to answer are: i)
What constitutes efficiency in this market, and how can we achieve this? ii)What is
the value of an intermediary firm - can an intermediary solve the potential problem
of implementing the socially optimal solution? We will also discuss briefly which
structure will emerge; i.e., will there be an intermediary firm in equilibrium, or will
the platform provider or the content providers sell directly to end-users?
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The basic model is described in
section 2 and the efficiency conditions are presented. The problem of implementing
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efficiency and sharing rules that may implement efficiency is discussed in section 3.
In section 4 some concluding remarks are made.
2 The model
Let us assume that total output of the composite product x is given by the deter-
ministic function: x = F (e), where e ≡ (eA, eB, eC) is the vector of effort exerted
by the three firms A, B and C. The total output is assumed to be observable, but
the individual efforts are not.
Let firm A be the platform (for example, an infrastructure provider or distribu-
tion firm), and B and C be complementors (e.g., content providers). The firms face
increasing and convex costs of effort, given by the cost function: vi (ei) = ϕie
2
i /2,
for i = A,B,C, with ϕi > 0 for all i. The content providers offer (a potentially
joint) output defined by q = q (eB, eC), where q is a index of the quality of the
content offered and q is increasing and concave in effort. The present set-up is a
combination of a team where the team members provide effort that are substitute
inputs in content production, and a complementary team.
The output of the composite product x can be more precisely defined as:
x = F (eA, q (eB, eC)) = min [bAeA, bqq (eB, eC)] (1)
where the parameter bA represents the productivity of firm A, and bq is an index
that represents the effect on the value of the composite output of increasing the
quality of content. The function (1) also defines the value of production.
Since the value of production can be shared by firms and/or the intermediary
firm and end-users, we require only the following:XC
i=A
αi (F (eA, q (eB, eC))) ≤ F (eA, q (eB, eC)) (2)
If (2) holds as an equality, the entire value of production is shared by the three
firms. If (2) holds as a strict inequality some surplus accrues to either the interme-
diary or end-users.
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We will in the following focus on linear sharing schemes. Let αi be firm i’s share
of (the value of) the total output, where we assume
X
i
αi ≤ 1, i = A,B,C. The
pay-off for firm i is given by:
πi = αimin [bAeA, bqq (eB, eC)]− vi (ei) = αimin [bAeA, bqq (eB, eC)]− ϕie2i /2 (3)
Due to the strict complementarity in the production function of the composite
product, either the (team) content input or the platform input will be a bottleneck
in the production of the composite product. The strict complementarity implies,
for example, that an increase in the quality of content only adds value if content
quality is the bottleneck factor. Along the lines of Vislie (1994) the (eA, q)-space
can be divided into two regions. If bAeA < bqq (eB, eC) then distribution effort is the
bottleneck and bAeA will be substituted into the profit function πi = αibAeA−vi (ei).
If bAeA > bqq (eB, eC), then πi = αibqq (eB, eC)− vi (ei).
2.1 Efficiency
The total surplus obtained from trade is given by:




Efficiency requires the following:
bAe
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where e∗ is the effort vector that ensures a maximisation of total surplus, eqn. (4).
The first efficiency condition, eqn. (5), is a requirement to ensure that no resources
are wasted, and which enables us to rewrite the total surplus (4) as a function of
the content providers efforts only. We will assume that the total surplus at efficient





i ) > 0.
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C) /bA into the objective function yields:




3It is shown below that this is indeed true in the context of the present model.
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where j = B,C.
In addition to the requirement imposed by eqn. (5), which in essence ensures
that the bundled product of platform and content services is provided efficiently,
efficiency requires that content provision is (stand-alone) efficient. The first-order
conditions with respect to the effort vector (eB, eC) implicitly define the optimal












− v0j = 0
To simplify the analysis and to obtain closed-form solutions, assume that vi (ei) =
ϕie
2
i /2 and q (eB, eC) =
P
j βjej. This formulation of the (content) quality function
is very stylised, but captures the idea that effort undertaken by the content providers
are substitutes (if one firm’s effort is increased the other can reduce his effort and
still remain on the same level of quality; increasing both firms’ effort levels increases
the level of quality supplied). The marginal effect of effort by the two firms B and
C may be different, and one way to think of this is to say that these firms provide
vertically differentiated efforts. Without loss of generality, I will assume that bq is
normalised to 1. The efficient effort level is determined by, for j, k = B,C, and







βj − ϕjej = 0























The socially optimal level of content quality can be deduced from (7), and can
be written as:
































− v00j < 0, and
is satisfied in an interior equilibrium.
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From (7) we observe that the efficient effort level for firm j is increasing in the
rival’s convexity parameter ϕk (i.e., the convexity parameter of the other content
team member), since these two firms’ efforts are substitutes. The optimal effort
of firm j is lower the more convex the platform provider’s effort cost is. This is
due to effort e∗A being decreasing in ϕA and complementarity. Consequently, since
higher effort cost implies a lower effort on behalf of the platform provider, efficiency
requires that the content quality q (e∗B, e
∗
C) also be reduced. The efficient effort
of a content provider may be either increasing or decreasing in the productivity
parameters βj and βk depending on relative productivity levels of the two firms,
and that of the platform provider. It can easily be shown that ej is increasing






> 0. In addition, it can be shown that
the effort of the platform provider is strictly increasing in either content provider’s
productivity level. If we assume that firm j is the more productive, then this implies
that it is the less likely that this firm’s efficient effort level increases with βj. The
seems somewhat counterintuitive, but the more productive firm is already exerting
a higher level of effort and since effort costs are convex the added value of firm j’s
additional effort is outweighed by his effort costs. In this case the less productive
firm will have to increase his level of effort since the platform provider increases his
effort.
2.1.1 Observable effort levels
Assume that the effort levels are observable. Then the efficient outcome defined
by (7), (8) and (9) can be implemented by forcing contracts with corresponding
compensations for the cost of effort. Total net surplus when implementing the effi-











C)) /2, which is strictly positive for all positive output levels. This
surplus can be distributed among the partners, the intermediary and the end-users.
Implementation of the efficient effort vector requires knowledge about marginal pro-
ductivity and the convexity of effort costs, which are assumed to be common knowl-
edge.
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2.2 Nash equilibrium with a linear sharing rule
When effort is unobservable, each of the players maximise her own utility given the
characteristics of the proposed sharing rule. Maximising (3) with respect to eA after





which yields an identical effort level as is found in Vislie (1994). Consequently, the
best-response function for firm A, (10), depends only factors related to firm A (the
sharing rule αA, the marginal productivity bA, and the convexity parameter ϕA).
If content is not a bottleneck factor, effort will be reduced until bAeA = q since
effort is costly and such effort will have no impact on total production due to strict
complementarity. If, on the other hand, we are in the region where content input is
the bottleneck, i.e., bAeA > q (eB, eC), the joint effort of firms B and C is the critical
factor. In this region, the profit for firm A is increasing in ej, and decreasing in eA.
Maximising (3) with respect to ej, where j = B,C:
ej (αj) = αjβj
ϕj
(11)
Since overall content quality is additively separable in the effort of the individual
content providers, the effort of each team member is independent of the effort level
of the competing team member for a given sharing rule. Looking at the content
provision provided by the team in the competitive market segment, we observe that
each of the content providers will achieve insufficient remuneration at the margin for
their efforts since αj must be less than or equal to 1, and consequently a sub-optimal
amount of effort will be exerted in content provision.
In order to ascertain the efficiency of production of the bundled product of con-
tent and platform services, we need to ensure that we are in fact on the bAe∗A =
q (e∗B, e
∗
C)-locus. Let us, for illustrative purposes, define the quasi best-response
function for q in this region to be the resulting quality of content provision for a
given sharing rule (αB, αC):





















The quasi-best response function is independent of eA in the region where content
provision is the bottleneck factor. In fig. 2 (loosely adapted from Vislie, 1994), the
best-response functions for eA and q are illustrated for a given set of (αA, αB, αC).
In the region where eA is the bottleneck, eA (αA) is independent of q, and in the
region where q is the bottleneck q (αB, αC) is independent of eA.
The best-response function for firm A is given by 0ACD, whereas the best-
response function for quality is given by 0AB. Provided that both zero effort and
zero content provision is ruled out, there will a continuum of Nash-equilibria along




C); in fig. 2 this is along the locus 0A. This is,
in essence, identical to that of Vislie (1994). If the entire value of the output is
shared among the firms, then reducing firm A’s share of the value of total output
shifts eA (αA) down, and q (αB, αC) up. This is, however, not necessarily the case,




3.1 Implementing the first-best effort levels




C), efficiency requires that αj be set
so that e∗j = ej, where e∗j is defined by (7) and ej is defined by (11), for j, k = B,C























Proposition 1 No simple linear sharing rule can implement the socially efficient
outcome in a situation with complementary teams when there is competition on one
side of the market.
With the sharing rule consisting of (12) and (13) budget balance is not ensured.
Adding up the share received by firms A, B and C shows that
PC
i=A αi > 1. This
implies that in order to implement the efficient outcome with a simple linear sharing
rule, the three firms must be allocated more than the total value of their joint output;
that is,
PC
i=A αiF (e) > F (e). Contrary to the complementary teams outcome in
Vislie (1994) no efficient linear sharing rule exists due to content being provided by
a team exerting substitutable efforts.
3.1.1 Symmetric effort costs
Assume that the content providers have identical (effort) cost functions vj (ej) =
ϕe2j/2 for j = B,C, and let q (eB, eC) =
P
j βjej. The (marginal) effort cost is
identical for both firms, but the effort of each of the content providers has a different
impact on content quality. The distribution network is assumed to have the following
effort cost function: vA (eA) = ϕAe
2
A/2. The solution for the socially efficient effort



















































Summing up (16) and (17), we find that the sharing rule which implements







which is strictly larger than 1.
3.2 Implementing second-best effort
The fact that there is competition in one of the market segments results in inability
to utilise simple linear sharing rules to implement the first-best effort levels. Put
differently, competition is not sustainable if one is restricted to linear sharing rules.
The result above assumes that all three firms must be active in an equilibrium.
Such a requirement can be due to regulatory and/or competition policy. One simple
way around the implementation problem would be to set the following sharing rule:©
αA = α
∗






. Then we are essentially back in the model of Vislie
(1994), and implementation of the socially efficient effort levels is possible by use of
linear sharing rules. Another way is to maximise a restricted welfare function, with
budget balance imposed directly on the maximisation problem. We will consider
both these situations.
3.2.1 Foreclosure
If we ban one of the content providers from delivering added value to content quality
by setting α∗k = 0, the socially optimal effort and quality levels will be different to
the levels defined by (7), (8) and (9). Define the level of optimal content quality
with a single content provider as q∗∗, and let the corresponding effort level for the
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content and platform providers be defined as e∗∗j and e
∗∗
A . These effort and quality




















Furthermore, define the difference ∆ ≡ q∗− q∗∗, where q∗ is defined by (9). It is
easily shown that∆ > 0. Thus, optimal quality is higher with two content providers.
The reason for this is twofold. First, the cost of effort is convex, which implies that
is more costly to produce the same effort level (and thereby quality) by a single
firm. This tends towards a lower socially optimal level of (total) effort with a single
content provider. Note, however, that the effort provided by the single remaining
content provider, firm j, is in fact higher compared to the effort provided by firm
j when all firms are active. However, provided that the more productive content
provider is chosen as the single provider the sum of effort exerted by firms j and k
in the first-best case is strictly larger than the effort provided by the single firm in
the second-best case. Second, the marginal effect on quality of effort plays a role.
The larger the marginal effect of effort on quality is for the active content provider,
all other things equal, the more likely is it that total effort is higher with two active
content providers. For a given cost function, a low marginal productivity of effort
implies that the content providers must compensate by increasing effort to ensure
high content quality. This can be seen directly from (7).
Let us, without loss of generality, assume that βj > βk. It is reasonable to
assume that if only one of the content providers is active, this will be the firm
that provides the highest effort level (for a given sharing rule) as given by (11). If
the content providers have identical cost functions (or ϕj ≤ ϕk), then ej > ek if






j . Even if this inequality
is not satisfied, the level of quality is reduced with a single content provider when
taking into account the marginal impact on content quality of effort by firms B and
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C. Since the content quality, q, is lower this implies from (5) that the effort provided
by the platform provider firm is lower than if all firms are being active.
3.2.2 Budget balanced sharing rule
In this section, we will derive the second-best solutions that satisfies the following
(relaxed) budget balance constraint (aA + aB + aC) = θ, where θ ≤ 1. This is
a sharing option that stakeholders that aims for maximum welfare can choose in
the absence of a rule that implements first-best social efficiency; i.e., if (21) is not
feasible. We will continue to assume that effort cost for the content provider is
symmetric; i.e., that vj (ej) = ϕe2j/2 for j = B,C.
Maximise W with respect to (aA, aB, aC), subject to the following set of con-
straints: i) bAeA = q (eB, eC), ii) eA (aA) = aAbA/ϕA, iii) eB (aB) = aBβB/ϕ and
iv) eC (aC) = aCβC/ϕ. The objective function can, after incorporating these con-
straints, be rewritten as:

























Then incorporate the additional constraint:


























− λ (aA + aB + aC − θ)
The solution that maximises welfare in (18) is summarised in the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 2When the proposed sharing rule must comply with the restriction
aA + aB + aC = θ, where θ represents the share of total output awarded to the three
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firms A, B and C, then the following shares will be allocated to the firms:








































When comparing the restricted output shares with the sharing rule that imple-
ment the first-best effort levels we find the following:
α∗A − baA > 0 (20)
α∗B − baB > 0 if b2AϕBϕC − ϕA ¡β2BϕC − β2CϕB¢ > 0
α∗C − baC > 0 if b2AϕBϕC + ϕA ¡β2BϕC − β2CϕB¢ > 0
Based on (19) and (20) we observe the following:
Corollary 1 i) The more productive of the content providers get more relative
to the less efficient partner in the second-best case (in the first-best case content
providers received equal shares).
ii) The more productive content provider may earn a higher share than in the
first-best case provided that the cost of effort for firm A is high and the difference in
productivity is sufficiently high.
iii) The platform provider always will earn less than in the first-best case.
A sufficient condition for α∗B − baB > 0 is βB < βC , but this is not sufficient to
ensure that α∗C−baC < 0. The restricted sharing rule (19) will lead to a distortion in
the second-best effort levels compared to first-best effort levels in the same direction
as above. We find the second-best effort levels by using (19), (11) and (10), and
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Provided that θ < 1, which implies that some surplus is left to either the inter-
mediary or the end-users, then the following is true:5
Corollary 2 i) Effort for firm A is distorted downwards from a situation where
θ = 1, since ∂eA/∂θ > 0.














We see from Corollary 2 that when a larger share of the value of output that is
allocated to the firms by increasing θ this results in an increase in the overall output
in the market.6 We also observe that the content providers’ effort levels may change
either way depending on relative productivity parameters. The less productive of
the content providers will always increase his effort as θ increases, and the more
efficient content provider may increase his effort (but by a smaller magnitude) if
the difference in content providers’ productivity is not too large and that the effort
cost for firm A is not too large. We see that if βC > βB, then ∂eB/∂θ < 0 and
∂eC/∂θ < 0 if ϕA is small and (βC − βB) not too positive. If ϕA is large and/or
(βC − βB) is large (and positive), then ∂eC/∂θ > 0.
5A sufficient but not necessary condition for the effort of firm B to be increasing in θ is βC >
βB , which is equivalent to the condition that ensures α
∗
B − baB > 0. A sufficient but not necessary
condition for the effort of firm C to be increasing is βB > βC , which is equivalent to ensuring that
α∗C − baC > 0.
6We observe that eA is increasing in θ, and since efficiency requires bAeA = βBeB+βCeC , then
the effort by content providers must also increase.
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3.3 Solving the implementation problem
In this section I will propose a sharing rules to attempt to correct for the inability of
a simple linear sharing rule to implement efficiency and budget balance.7 To be more
precise, we do not require budget balance but rather that
PC
i=A αiF (e) ≤ F (e). We
assume that the platform provider is the residual claimant, but not necessarily of
the total value of production. The share of the value of output allocated to the
three firms depends on who sets the tariff, and this may be either the platform, the
intermediary or end-users.
Proposition 3 The following sharing rule implements the socially efficient effort
vector e∗ and ensures bAe∗A = q
∗ :
αj =
⎧⎨⎩ aj if x ≥ F (e∗) ≡ min {bAe∗A, βBe∗B + βCe∗C}0 if x < F (e∗) ≡ min {bAe∗A, βBe∗B + βCe∗C}
αA = θ − aB − aC (21)
This particular sharing rule can be given different interpretations depending on
the purchasing arrangements, and will depend both on who bundles and sells the
product (i.e., who proposes the sharing rule), and how the bargaining power is
allocated among the economic agents in the game (i.e., who determines θ). Another
way of interpreting the sharing rule is that either the intermediary (or end-users)
device a contract that specifies how much of the total output should be awarded to
the content providers and how much the intermediary (or end-users) retains. We
assume that the player that proposes the sharing rule can commit to this rule. As
we will see below, this may not always be the case. In particular, if the player that
proposes the sharing rule is a stakeholder there may be a commitment problem.
Let us see why this rule implements the socially efficient outcome.8 We know
that e∗ defines the (unique) efficient output and is the effort vector that maximises
(4). This yields the socially optimal quality level, q∗, defined by (9). To allow for the
7Legros and Matthews (1993) provide necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency in teams
in a generalised setting.
8The sharing rule is similar to that proposed by Holmstrom (1982).
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possibility that the intermediary firm or end-users capture some of the surplus, we
let θ ∈ (aB + aC , 1]. The total value of the partnership output is, by construction,
divided among the (productive) partnership members if θ = 1. This case may
be seen as the outcome with perfect price discrimination. If, on the other hand,
θ = aB + aC the intermediary firm (or end-users) takes all the residual profit. This
leaves the platform provider with a negative profit for all positive effort levels, which
will induce zero effort by the platform provider. To avoid this we will assume that
firm A earns a strictly positive share of the value of total output. The proposed
sharing rule implies that the distribution network is residual claimant of the value
of production if θ = 1. If θ = 1 this implies that neither the intermediary nor
end-users gain positive surplus, and can be interpreted as the case where both the
market for intermediaries is highly competitive and all bargaining power rests with
the platform provider. Thus, θ can be seen as a proxy for both competition in the
market for intermediaries and a proxy for bargaining power.
The payoffs can be rewritten as follows:9
πj =
⎧⎨⎩ ajx− ϕje2j/2 if x ≥ F (e∗) ≡ min {bAe∗A, βBe∗B + βCe∗C}−ϕje2j/2 if x < F (e∗) ≡ min {bAe∗A, βBe∗B + βCe∗C} (22)
and
πA =
⎧⎨⎩ (θ − aB − aC)x− ϕAe2A/2 if x ≥ F (e∗) ≡ min {bAe∗A, βBe∗B + βCe∗C}θx− ϕAe2A/2 if x < F (e∗) ≡ min {bAe∗A, βBe∗B + βCe∗C}
(23)
where x is defined by (1). From (22) it is clear that no single content provider has
an incentive to deviate from the socially optimal effort level e∗j , provided that firm A
chooses eA = e∗A, and provided that the game is played only once. If either content
provider deviates from the socially optimal effort levels, they will earn negative
profits. Firm A, on the other hand, may have an incentive to deviate when (e∗B, e
∗
C).
By choosing a lower effort than e∗A, we are in the region where distribution effort
9The pay-off functions will naturally be affected by which factor is the bottleneck.
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is the bottleneck; bAeA < q∗ (e∗B, e
∗
C). The profit for firm A depends here only on
its own effort eA. In the same region, it is easily seen that firm j benefits from an
increase in eA and a reduction in ej. The region in which either input is a bottleneck
is endogenous and will depend on the sharing rule. If the sharing rule is such that
the content providers get a small share of the value of the output, this will result in
a low effort and consequently in low content quality q. If the sharing rule is defined
by (21) and provided that firms B and C choose e∗B and e
∗
C, firm A will receive
a net profit provided that êA satisfies the following: πA = θbAêA − ϕAê2A/2 > 0.







C) < θbAêA− ϕAê2A/2, assuming socially optimal effort levels (e∗B, e∗C)
by the content providers.
A deviation from the socially optimal level must be such that êA < e∗A. Any
deviation such that êA > e∗A implies that content quality is the bottleneck factor, and
firm A’s profit is decreasing in its own effort in this region. If the sharing rule is such
that 1 ≥ θ ≥ α∗A, then êA = e∗A. If (aB + aC) < θ < α∗A, the distribution network is
the bottleneck and the maximisation problem of firm A yields êA = θbA/ϕA. This










and the profit in the socially optimal outcome is, which we will assume is strictly
positive (a sufficient condition for this is that more than 50% of the value of total
























































¢2 < 0 (25)
This shows that the distribution network will earn higher profit when deviating
even when aB = aC = 0, provided that (e∗B, e
∗






necessary to leave the content providers with a positive share of output, but this




C) is even smaller. This means
that the profit difference in (25) becomes more negative.
The content providers will earn negative profits (zero profits if ej,k = 0) if they
choose a lower effort than (e∗B, e
∗
C) even if eA = e
∗
A, since the content quality is
the bottleneck in such a case. This would imply that ej,k = 0. A positive level of
effort would yield negative profits. Thus, in the event of a deviation in effort levels
this would imply zero effort (and zero profit). The distribution network may still
deviate from e∗A profitably, for a given set of positive (eB, eC) since A may capture
some surplus even with eA < e∗A. This incentive will be foreseen by the content
providers, and they will choose zero effort, which will result in zero production and
negative profit for firm A. This implies that the only Nash equilibrium in effort




C). In addition, budget balance may be
achieved by setting θ = 1.
We assumed initially that the sharing rule can be committed to. There may,
however, be a problem with lack of commitment to the proposed sharing rule, de-
pending on who proposes the sharing rule. Firm A is a stakeholder in the game,
and may have an incentive to renegotiate if x < F (e∗), to avoid an outcome with
zero production. In other words, the punishment of a zero share of the output may
not be credible.
The platform sets the sharing rule One interpretation of the sharing rule
(21) can be that the platform sets the rule to maximise its own profit. It is straight-
forward to check that πA is increasing in θ which implies that the platform provider
will choose to retain the residual value of output if θ is a decision variable for firm
A by choosing θ = 1 to maximise its own profit. The platform will bypass the inter-
mediary provided that commitment is possible. It is, however, possible that the size
of θ is determined to be strictly lower than 1, e.g., through regulatory intervention,
or due to distribution of bargaining power.10
The timing of the game is as follows: First a decision on θ is made. Then, the
10The bargaining process is not investigated in the present paper.
21
decision maker decides on how to share the value of output (given the decision on θ).
Finally, firms i = A,B,C choose their effort levels. Below, we will also consider the
case in which commitment is not possible. Then, renegotiation of the sharing rule
will take place if (21) does not provide sufficient remuneration for firms.11 Initially,
it is assumed that the game is a one-shot game without the option of renegotiation.
If we assume that no renegotiation is possible then a sharing rule that implements
the socially optimal effort vector will be proposed if the profit for firm A in the first-
best optimum is higher than in the second-best optimum. We need to compare the
platform’s profit when socially optimal effort levels are implemented with the case
where the platform maximises its profits with respect to (aB, aC), subject to the
best-response functions of the content providers.
Lemma 1 To ensure implementation of the efficient sharing rule (21) the profit
for firm A with the efficient effort vector, defined as π∗A, must be higher than in the
best alternative, defined as π0A.
The platform provider can alternatively propose to implement a different sharing
rule. It can be shown that firm A’s profit is decreasing in (aB, aC), so firm A will
wish to set the sharing parameters to firms B and C as low as possible, but the
content providers must be allocated a part of the value of output to induce positive
effort levels. In the following I will maintain the assumption that the effort costs of
the content providers are symmetric; ϕB = ϕB = ϕ.
Maximising πA = (θ − aB − aC) bAeA − ϕA2 (eA)
2 with respect to eA yields the
profit maximising output level:
e0A ≡
(θ − aB − aC) bA
ϕA
By using the fact that efficient production due to strict complementarity implies
11In order to be able to implement the first-best outcome, two (incentive) conditions must
be satisfied: 1) The decision maker must earn higher profit in the first-best case, and 2) the
(productive) firms must earn at least the same level of profit as in the alternative outcome (the
renegotiation case).
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(θ − aj − ak) b2A
ϕA
(26)













and can be shown that the platform provider can, by choosing the most productive
content provider as the only provider, minimise transfers and still produce the profit
maximising level of output:
Lemma 2 (Alternative sharing rule) If the platform provider chooses an alter-
native sharing rule to (21), then only the most productive content provider will be
offered a positive share of the value of output. The share awarded to the content
provider is defined below by (28).
Assume without loss of generality that βj > βk. Then, firm j will be chosen to
provide content, and the higher βj is the lower share of output is awarded to the
content provider. This may seem somewhat counterintuitive, but the reason for this
is simply that the more productive an agent is the higher is his effort for a given
share of the value of output. Thus, a certain quality level for content provision can
be achieved either by the less productive agent by awarding a higher share of the
value of output, or it can be achieved at lower cost (for the agent proposing the
contract) by the more productive agent. If we assume that firm j is chosen, the







which leaves the following share to firm A :














By examining the profit for firm A in the case where first-best effort levels are
implemented with sharing rule (21), we will be able to ascertain whether firm A will
want to implement this rule. In order to make the comparison we need to determine
the share of the value of output that content providers require to satisfy the limited







Inserting for socially optimal content quality (9), effort for firm j (7), and setting
π∗j = 0, we find the lowest share aj that firm j will accept. Let us define this as eaj,














where eaj + eak < 1/2. The share to firm A is given by:









By comparing (32) and (29) we find that the former is strictly larger than the
latter, and consequently the platform provider obtains a larger share of the value of
output when the efficient effort vector is implemented provided that θ ≥ 1/2. This
condition must be met to ensure non-negative profit for firm A when the efficient
effort vector is implemented, and is assumed to be satisfied throughout. Comparing
(15) with (30), we find that effort is higher for firm A when the first-best effort levels
are implemented.
Lemma 3 If the platform chooses the efficient sharing rule, (21), a positive share
of the value of output will be awarded to firms j = B,C, defined by (31).
From Lemmas 1-3 we have the following main result:
Proposition 4 i) If the entire value of output is shared among the three pro-
ductive firms, A,B and C, then firm A will want to implement the efficient sharing
rule given by (21).
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ii) If some of the surplus is awarded to economic agents other than A,B or C





















When comparing profit levels for firm A it is revealed that π∗A−π0A > 0 if θ = 1.
Here, π∗A is the profit level for A with a share to content firms j and k given by
(eaj,eak) and with efficient effort levels, whereas π0A is the profit level associated with
the outcome in the alternative sharing rule (28) with only a single content provider.
Consequently, setting θ = 1 ensures that the platform provider will choose a sharing
rule to implement the first-best outcome.12 The reason for this seems to be due to
the fact that the implementation of the first-best effort levels is less costly than in
the alternative solution. This is partly due to the fact that a single provider is chosen
in the alternative case and is induced to provide excessive effort, since e∗j − e0j < 0,
which combined with a convex effort cost necessitates a higher transfer to the content
provider. However, if θ ∈ [0.5, 1), i.e., if some of the value of production must be
allocated to the intermediary or to end-users, the inequality (33) must be satisfied
to ensure implementation of the first-best effort vector.
This inequality is not trivially satisfied for all permissible parameter combina-
tions. Hence, for some combinations of parameter values the first-best outcome
will not be implemented when the platform provider decides the sharing rule and
if some of the value of production must be left to end-users (i.e., if θ < 1). This is
summarised this in the following corollary:
Corollary 3 The first-best efficient outcome will not be implemented if (33) is
violated. This condition will be violated when the productivity parameter of the most
productive content provider becomes large, the productivity of the less productive firm
becomes low, and when the platform provider is unable to capture a sufficiently large
share of the surplus (in particular, if θ is relatively small and close to 1/2.
12The condition θ = 1 is, as we will see below, not sufficient in the case when renegotiation is
possible.
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The content providers will earn zero profit in the first-best scenario (by assump-
tion) regardless the level of θ, which is less than in the alternative scenario since
π0j > 0. They are consequently worse off if the platform provider can commit to the
first-best scenario.13
End-users set the sharing rule In this setting, we assume that the end-
users bypass the intermediary and purchases directly from the firms. The end-users
cannot observe the individual components of the product, but this is not necessary
as we have already seen that the sharing rule (21) implements the first-best effort
levels. The end-users simply propose a sharing rule that allocates part of the surplus
from trade to the three firms, and set θ to maximise consumers’ surplus. The game
is a one-shot game. The total value of production is here given as F (eA, q (eB, eC)).
Consumers’ surplus is decreasing in θ, and will be zero if θ = 1, and is given by:
CS (eA, eB, eC) = (1− θ)F (eA, q (eB, eC)) (34)
The end-users must ensure that the sharing rule specifies shares to the three
firms such that they will participate voluntarily (i.e., that profits are non-negative).
We have seen that θ ≥ 1/2 is a sufficient condition for satisfying the constraint for
the platform provider. A necessary condition to ensure non-negative profits for firm















¢¢ ≡ θ∗ (35)
By choosing aj = eaj for j = B,C, where eaj is defined by (31) and θ = θ∗ < 1/2,
end-users ensure that profits for all productive firms are non-negative. This yields
the highest end-users’ surplus in the first-best effort case, while at the same time
ensuring voluntary participation by all three firms. If a sharing rule that implements






















13The fact that the content providers will earn higher profit with the alternative sharing rule
implies that there may be commitment problems. This will be investigated below.
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If end-users choose an alternative sharing rule to (21) they will face a trade-
off since increasing the share to the productive firms will result in a direct loss to
end-users, but it also increases the total output. Maximising (34) with respect to θ
yields:
θcs =






Furthermore, efficiency in production requires that (5) is satisfied. Combining
this with (37) implies that any combination of (aj, ak) satisfying the following ensures
an outcome that maximises end-users’ surplus:






















Along the same lines as the argument in relation to Lemma 2, it can easily be
shown that the lowest transfer to content providers that conforms with (38) is to
choose only the most productive of the content providers. Consequently, if βj > βk
then firm j will be the single active content provider. The surplus for the end-users











It can easily be shown that CS∗ > CS0, which implies that end-users will if
possible always choose the sharing rule that implements social efficiency.
The intermediary sets the sharing rule In the cases where either the plat-
form provider or the end-users cannot commit to a sharing rule that implements
efficiency, the use of a market intermediary may be beneficial. If we consider a com-
petitive market for intermediaries, then the intermediary firm will earn zero profit.
Assuming that the marginal cost of the intermediary is normalised to zero, but al-
lowing for a fixed cost F for setting up the intermediary with F ≥ 0, the value of
output is shared among the active firms and end-users but with some concessions
made for the recovery of the fixed cost (this will imply that θ cannot be 1 unless
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fixed costs are zero). The intermediary will be indifferent between the different out-
comes, in which case we assume that he will and can commit to the sharing rule (21)
that implements the efficient outcome characterised by (7), (8) and (5). By setting
θ ≥ θ∗ and aj,k = eaj,k the intermediary ensures non-negative profits for all three
active firms.14 There is a continuum of equilibria that supports efficiency, and the
choice of allocation is in part dictated by who determines the size of θ. As we have
seen above, the platform provider would determine a θ = 1 whereas the end-users
would set θ = θcs, where θcs is defined by (37) which is strictly less than 1.
Provided that the inequality (33) is violated, then the platform provider will
not choose the sharing rule that implements first-best effort. For certain parameter
values (see Corollary 3) the intermediary may add value by allowing the implemen-
tation of the first-best outcome. The value of the intermediary can then be said
to be the difference in welfare in the two cases (the first-best and the alternative
outcomes) less the fixed cost of the intermediary. We will investigate this below.
3.3.1 Welfare comparison
Let us compare welfare in the case where the socially efficient solution is implemented
with the alternative outcome. This will give us a measurement for the value of
the intermediary. The first case, with sharing rule (21), which yields the sharing
vector (eaj,eak,eaA) and ensures both budget balance and first-best efficiency, and the
second case where the platform provider uses the sharing rule (28) in which a single
content provider is active (i.e., only the most efficient content provider is active).
Let βj > βk, which implies that content provider j will be active in the second case.
















¢¢ = F (e∗A, q (e∗B, e∗C)) /2 > 0 (41)














¢ = (2− θ)F ¡e0A, q ¡e0j, ek = 0¢¢ /2 > 0 (42)
14Note that the necessary condition on θ is reported in (35).
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Comparing (41) and (42) it is easily shown that welfare is strictly higher when
all three firms are active for all permissible values for θ (this is, naturally, so by







shows how high the added value of the intermediary is exclusive of fixed









































We immediately have the following result:
Proposition 5 i) If consumers cannot purchase the product directly and the
platform provider has no incentive to implement the first-best allocation, then an
intermediary firm is welfare improving if the following holds: γ ≥ F .
ii) For an intermediary firm to appear as a distribution channel in equilibrium
we also require that no other market structures dominates the market structure with
the intermediary.
If the expression (43), which is defined as γ, is larger than the fixed cost F of the
intermediary, then it implies that the presence of an intermediary firm adds value
to the market when the platform provider will not choose a sharing rule that imple-
ments the first-best effort levels (see corollary 3) and provided that end-users cannot
purchase directly from the firms. If, however, F is larger than (43) this implies that
social welfare is higher with the alternative outcome and that the intermediary gen-
erates no added value.
3.4 Commitment problems
In this section we will investigate how the sharing rule must be adjusted when
renegotiation is possible. I will only investigate the potential commitment problem
in the case where the platform decides on the sharing rule. The platform cannot
necessarily commit to a sharing rule that imposes negative transfers on the content
providers, since the platform may have incentives to renegotiate to avoid a zero or
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negative profit level. There are now two conditions that must be satisfied to ensure
that commitment is feasible:
Lemma 1’ To ensure implementability of the efficient sharing rule (21) the profit
for firm A and firm j, for j = B,C, with the efficient effort vector must be higher
than the alternative level of profit; i) π∗A ≥ π0A and ii) π∗j ≥ π0j.
If the platform provider cannot commit to the sharing rule that implements the
socially efficient effort vector, then an alternative sharing rule will be implemented
since the platform provider will benefit from renegotiating the sharing rule in the
event of a zero output. Since ∂πA/∂aj < 0 firm A will set the sharing parameters to
firms B and C as low as possible, but firm A needs to take into account the response
of firm j to changes in the sharing rule. We have seen in section 3.3 that (27) defines
the combination of (aj, ak) that implements the profit maximising output level. The
platform provider can, by choosing the most productive content provider as the only
provider, minimise transfers and still produce the profit maximising level of output:
Lemma 2’ If the platform provider cannot commit to the sharing rule that im-
plements first-best efficiency, (21), then only the most productive content provider
will be offered a positive share of the value of output. The share awarded to the
content provider is identical to the alternative sharing rule discussed above and is
defined by (28).
By examining the profit for firms A,B and C in the case where first-best effort
levels are implemented with sharing rule (21), we will be able to ascertain whether







Inserting for socially optimal content quality (9), effort for firm j (7), and setting
π∗j = π
0
j, we find the lowest share aj that firm j will accept if the first-best effort
level is chosen. This share is defined as aj, where aj > eaj and where eaj is defined
by (31):












The loss imposed on the platform provider in order to satisfy the (incentive)



































¢2 > 0 (45)
Lemma 3’ If the platform provider can commit to the efficient sharing rule,
(21), he will award a positive share of the value of output to firms j = B,C, defined
by (44). The platform provider will obtain a profit level given by π∗∗A ≡ π∗A −∆∗.
The comparison between the share allocated to the platform provider and the
level of profit is a little less straightforward compared to the case where renegotiation
is not possible (as discussed in section 3.3). However, it can be shown that the profit
for firm A, when implementing the first-best effort vector with the sharing rule (21)
and (44), is strictly positive for θ = 1. Profit is strictly negative for θ = 1/2, which
was the zero profit condition without renegotiation. It can also be shown that
π∗∗A continuously differentiable and strictly increasing in θ, which implies that by
continuity the profit for firm A is also positive for 1 > θ > 1/2. The non-negativity
condition for profit π∗∗A when the efficient effort vector is implemented is assumed to
be satisfied throughout.
From Lemmas 1’ - 3’ we have the following result, which differs from the equiv-
alent result in the no-renegotiation case:
Proposition 6 Contrary to the situation where renegotiation is not possible, the
platform provider will not commit to the efficient sharing rule given by (21) even if
the entire value of the output is shared among the three firms, A,B and C, since
profit is always higher with the alternative sharing rule for all permissible parameter
values.
Proof: If θ = 1, then π∗∗A − π0A < 0, where π∗∗A is the profit level for A with
shares (aj, ak) to the content providers and with efficient effort levels e∗. π0A > 0
is the profit level associated with the outcome in the alternative sharing rule (28)
with only a single content provider. Furthermore, ∂ (π∗∗A − π0A) /∂θ < 0 for 1 ≥ θ ≥
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bθ > 1/2, where bθ ≡ (ϕb2A+ϕAβ2j)(ϕb2A+ϕAβ2k)2(β2j+β2k)
(ϕ2b4A(β2j+β2k)+ϕAβ2jβ2k(3ϕb2A+ϕAβ2k))(ϕb2A+ϕA(β2j+β2k))
. Furthermore,
π∗∗A (θ = 1/2)− π0A (θ = 1/2) < 0 since π∗∗A (θ = 1/2) < 0 and π0A > 0 for all positive
θ. Thus, there is no permissible value for θ such that π∗∗A − π0A ≥ 0. QED.
Proposition 6 tells us that the platform provider, who is one of the productive
partners, will not have any incentives to implement the socially optimal sharing rule
when renegotiation is possible. This is contrary to the outcome discussed in section
3.3 where renegotiation could not take place. The lack of commitment to the sharing
rule that implements the first-best effort vector, (21), thus results in an inefficiency
even when the entire surplus is allocated to the three productive firms. The cost of
inducing the content providers to exert the socially optimal effort levels voluntarily,
in essence given by (45), becomes too high.
If an intermediary firm is set up to facilitate the trade between the productive
firms and end-users, we have seen that if this intermediary is in a competitive market
and earning zero profit, then commitment is not an issue. The reason for this is due
to the fact that the intermediary will be indifferent between the different outcomes
(see also Proposition 5).
4 Concluding remarks
The present paper investigates a market with strictly complementary inputs, and the
organisation of the distribution and sale of a bundled product to end-users. There
are both productive firms (a monopoly platform provider and content providers)
and an intermediary firm in the model, and the paper analyses if and how efficiency
can be implemented by the use of linear sharing rules when effort is unobservable.
The model is a combination of complementary team production and production in
teams with substitutable efforts.
The motivation behind the model formulation has been taken (mainly) from
communications markets, with the monopoly firm being a platform or distribution
firm and the competitive market segment being content providers. One of the main
results in the paper is that, contrary to models of complementary teams without
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competition, simple linear sharing rules cannot implement the socially efficient solu-
tion when (weak) budget balance is required. In addition, it is shown that a modified
version of the group penalty sharing rule proposed by Holmstrom (1982) can im-
plement efficiency under certain circumstances. The ability to implement first-best
efficient outcomes depends both on which economic agent decides on the sharing rule
and whether commitment to the rule is possible. In particular, if the (monopoly)
platform provider decides on the sharing rule and renegotiation is possible, then he
will not have an incentive to implement first-best as he will earn a higher level of
profit with an alternative sharing rule.
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Inserting for λ = λ∗ in aA, aB, and aC yields:
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